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Abstract 
G.J. Simmons has advanced the concept of using authentication in an 
open channel to actually convey information. We review the use of the 
knapsack problem for public codes and explore the use of Shamir's method 
for a signature only knapsack to convey messages. 
Introduction 
Simmons describes subverting authentication to carry secret informa-
tion when the message-signature pair (M, C) is transported by a neutral 
or hostile medium on an open channel. Simmons describes how a warden 
might pennit a trustee (or say the Red Cross) to carry an open communica-
tion between X and Y in the hope that he can deceive at least one into 
accepting as a genuine communication 
(a) a fraudulent message created by the warden, or 
(b) a modification of a genuine message. 
X and Y accept the use of an open channel and a potentially hostile 
transporter in order to have any communication at all but insist on a 
signature or authentication attached to the communication. 
The model can be described by the following diagram. 
Initiator , Receiver 
sends checks 
message OPEN CHANNEL signature (data link, telephone, telex, with signature trustee, third person) given public key 
As Simmons notes, there can be many valid signatures for one message, 
and if the signature space can be partitioned. information can be 
conveyed by the choice of signature. 
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o 
Signatures 
Shami r' s Method 
Authenti ca ti on 
(function A) 
CiA = M.¥i. 
We first review Shamir's knapsack code for authentication without 
secrecy. 
H is k x 2k random (0, 1) matrix, 
M is the message, 
Mis M written in binary with digits reversed to form a k-bit number; 
the method solves 
HA " [U (mod oi 
to form A" (a1 •... ,a2k )T (since H;s k x 2k, HA gives k equations in 2k 
unknowns and so there is freedom to arbitrarily choose k of the coordin-
ates of A). 
The transmission procedure can be represented diagramatically as 
Public 
k!!y 
A,o 
Transmitter 
signforms c 
C = MH, 
H secret 
The method works because 
transmit on 
open channel 
(M, Ci 
../' "'-message signature 
M (mod nl, 
) 
Receiver (or 
adjudicator) 
authenticates 
CA = M (mod n). 
but to thwart the system it is necessary to solve CA = M (mod n), where 
A and M are known. which is precisely the knapsack problem. 
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Added Security in Shamir's Method 
Nevertheless, security may be lessened if an observer obtains many 
sets of (A. n. Mi' Ci ) and can deduce H. So Shamir suggested choosing 
a 1 x 2k random binary vector and fonning 
MI M-RAorM=M1+RA 
ci j;j-lH giving CIA'" MIHA '" MI 
C2 C
I + R. 
Diagramatically we now have 
Public Transmi tter transmi ts 
A. " forms C2 over open channel 
(M. ',) 
This method works because 
C
2
A '" {Cl + R)A '" CIA + RA '" MIHA + RA 
'" MI + RA (mod n) 
M. 
A Subliminal Message? 
Authenicator 
forms • C2A '" M 
We note there are at least 22k Ci such that CiA" M. Hence if we 
can recover R or part of R we can send a subliminal message in our 
transmitted pair (M. C2). 
Now we suppose the message has been transmitted over an open 
channel using Shamir's signature scheme. The hostile or neutral 
transporter can check C2A '" M. but we assume the receiver knows 
everything the transmitter knows except the random 1 x 2k binary 
vector R. Thus the receiver knows M, H, C2• A. n. Hence the receiver 
can form 
CI '" MH 
and knows 
C ~ Cl + R '" MIH + R. 2 -
The receiver must solve this equation to find R.and this is 
equivalent to solving the knapsack problem. 
A Trapdoor to Recover the Message 
(1 ) 
To solve for R we need a trapdoor. Suppose there exists a (lx2k) 
vector B such that HB " 0; then equation (1) becomes on multiplying by B 
C
2
B '" MIHB + RB '" RB{mod n). 
3' 
Hence. if in addition B is superincreasing we can solve for R. 
Diagramatically 
Publi c 
A, " 
Secret 
M, B 
Form 
signatur 
" 
transmit on 
open ch·annel (M, Cz) , Authenticate M " CZA 
Subliminal 
sol ve 
CZB " RB 
to find R 
Example: - 1 M = Z. M = 01. M 3(mod 5), C2 (3. 3, I, 4) 
Public 
A=(1,Z,3,O) 
n = 5 
Secret 
'M.[02-l0]' 
: 2 1 1-1 : 
. T' 
: B "(1.Z.4.8) : 
Signature 
CZ,,(3,3,I,4) 
transmit 
(' , (3,3,1,4) 
, Authenticate ',A · 3+6+3+0 · 12(mod 5) 
• M 
Subl iminal 
sol ve 
:CZB 3+6+4+32 
O(mod 5) 
R (1,0.1.0) 
or (0,1,0,1) 
or (1,1.1.1) 
To be precise R" (0.1,0.1). RZ " (1,0,1,0), R3 " (1,1,1,1) correspond to 
the Signatures C1 = (0,1,0,1), C2 = (3.3.1.4) and C3 " (1,3,0.1) of the 
message M = 2 and we need to re-encipher to establish which solution for 
R corresponds to the subliminal message R. 
For added security, the elements of Hand B can be permuted. or B 
could be modified using modular arithmetic, as proposed by Merkle and 
Hellman [2]. 
Conclusion 
If a suitable secret matrix H. not necessarily binary, and a secret 
easy to solve knapsack vector B such that HB = 0 exists, then Shamir's 
signature only knapsack authentication scheme can be modified to carry 
secret messages. This method appears to be more secure than the 
original knapsack encoding schemes as the third party is presumably 
unaware that any secret information is being conveyed. Furthermore, 
both the secret encipherment matrix H and solving knapsack B are not 
made public. 
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